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Is There a Stare Decisis Doctrine in
the Court of Arbitration for Sport?
An Analysis of Published Awards for
Anti-Doping Disputes in
Track and Field
Annie Bersagel*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) provides a unique example of
a private international legal regime that has almost entirely displaced
domestic adjudication of certain types of disputes. 1 Based in Lausanne,
Switzerland, the CAS exercises jurisdiction over commercial and
disciplinary disputes in connection with the Olympic Games, as well as
disputes involving international sporting federations that have consented to
CAS jurisdiction. 2 In contrast to the practice in the overwhelming majority
of arbitral tribunals, CAS panels rely heavily on previous arbitral awards in
reaching their decisions. 3 CAS panels’ liberal use of citations to previous
CAS awards has led legal scholars to recognize the practice as evidence of

* Annie Bersagel J.D. (2012) candidate at Stanford Law School and a former All-American in track
and field and cross country for Wake Forest University. She represented the United States in the
10,000m at the 2011 Pan American Games in Guadalajara, Mexico, the 2006 World Road Running
Championships in Debrecen, Hungary, and the 2006 Yokohama International Women’s Ekiden
Relay in Yokohama, Japan.
1. Ken Foster, Is There a Global Sports Law?, 2 ENT. & SPORTS L.J., no. 1, 2003 at 15
[hereinafter Foster, Is There a Global Sports Law?], available at
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/eslj/issues/volume2/number1/foster.pdf (discussing the
means by which international sports federations grant the CAS exclusive jurisdiction, thereby
restricting their members from adjudicating disputes in national courts).
2. History of the CAS: Origins, CT. ARB. FOR SPORT, http://www.tas-cas.org/history (last
visited Mar. 31, 2012).
3. See infra notes 35-46 and accompanying text (discussing the CAS’s unique reliance on
precedent, as compared to most arbitral tribunals).
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an emerging lex sportiva,4 defined by CAS interpretations of a growing body
of international sporting codes and regulations.
While the importance of precedent in CAS awards is by now a matter
beyond dispute,5 a more controversial claim concerns whether the CAS
applies a de facto principle of stare decisis—a hallmark of the common law
system—in its jurisprudence.6 In practice, application of stare decisis may
be difficult to distinguish from that of jurisprudence constante, the civil law
doctrine that courts should not depart from a line of past decisions “unless
clear error is shown and injustice will arise from continuation of a particular
rule of law.”7 Thus, in contrast to the doctrine of stare decisis, there is no
strict requirement to follow past precedent under jurisprudence constante.
This article adopts an empirical approach to the debate over the use of
precedent in the CAS by analyzing a sample of CAS awards issued between
2000 and 2010—namely, all published awards involving disciplinary
violations related to anti-doping for the sport of track and field. The results
of this analysis are consistent with previous scholarship noting the CAS’s
tendency to follow past precedent. 8 Nevertheless, CAS panels’ explicit
rejection of a doctrine of stare decisis suggests the practice is better
characterized as a doctrine of jurisprudence constante.9 This study supports

4. See, e.g., FRANCK LATTY, LA LEX SPORTIVA: RECHERCHE SUR LE DROIT TRANSNATIONAL
(2007); Ken Foster, Lex Sportiva and Lex Ludica: The Court of Arbitration for Sport’s
Jurisprudence, 3 ENT. & SPORTS L.J., no. 2, 2005 [hereinafter Foster, Lex Sportiva and Lex Ludica],
available at
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/eslj/issues/volume3/number2/foster/foster.pdf.
5. See, e.g., Canadian Olympic Comm. (COC) v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS
2002/O/373, ¶ 14 (Dec. 18, 2003) (“CAS jurisprudence has notably refined and developed a number
of principles of sports law . . . which might be deemed part of an emerging ‘lex sportiva.’”).
6. Compare Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse?
23 ARB. I NT’ L 357, 366 (2007) [hereinafter Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitral Precedent] (arguing that
CAS awards “demonstrate the existence of a true stare decisis doctrine within the field of sports
arbitration”), with IAN S. BLACKSHAW, SPORT, MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION 155 (2009)
(observing that “CAS arbitrators . . . are not generally obliged to follow earlier decisions (stare
decisis), but they usually do so in the interests of legal certainty”). See also Matthew J. Mitten &
Hayden Opie, “Sports Law”: Implications for the Development of International, Comparative, and
National Law and Global Dispute Resolution, 85 TUL. L. REV. 269, 291 (2010) (questioning whether
“CAS jurisprudence [is] functioning as a de facto body of common law legal precedent”).
7. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 933 (9th ed. 2009). See Andrè Tunc, Methodology of the Civil
Law in France, in CIVIL LAW 327, 332-33 (Ralf Rogowski ed., 1996) (describing French courts’
reliance on the decisions of the Court of Cassation).
8. See, e.g., BLACKSHAW, supra note 6; Foster, Lex Sportiva and Lex Ludica, supra note 4, at
12; Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitral Precedent, supra note 6.
9. See, e.g., Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns (IAAF) v. U.S.A. Track & Field (USATF), CAS
2004/A/628 (June 28, 2004); Anderson v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS 2008/A/1545, ¶ 3 (July
16, 2010) (“In CAS jurisprudence there is no principle of binding precedent (‘stare decisis’ or
‘collateral estoppel’).”).
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the hypothesis that the use of precedent depends on panel composition.
Most panels in this study consisted of both common law and civil law
arbitrators, and those comprised of solely civil law jurists were just as likely
to cite precedent as common law panels.10 Further research is needed to
clarify how the use of precedent in the CAS interacts with the institution’s
default rules for choice of law.
Part I of this article outlines a brief history of the CAS and its
procedural rules. Part II describes the debate over whether the CAS follows
a doctrine of stare decisis. Part III sets out the methodology used. Part IV
describes the results of the analysis, including an in-depth look at two
awards that touch directly on the relevance of past arbitral awards. Part V
concludes by discussing the implications of the results of this study and
suggesting avenues for future research.
II. OVERVIEW OF CAS HISTORY AND PROCEDURE
The International Olympic Committee (IOC) established the CAS in
198411 to create a uniform body of rules for international sports disputes, and
to avoid the problem of athletes pursuing complex and costly litigation in
national courts.12 Two different arbitration divisions comprise the CAS:
Ordinary and Appellate. 13 The CAS has also established ad hoc tribunals for
the Olympic Games 14 and other major international sports competitions,
such as the Fèdèration Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World
Cup soccer tournament. 15 The CAS Ad Hoc Division hears disputes on-site
and render decisions within twenty-four hours.16 The Ordinary Arbitration
10. See infra Part IV.
11. BLACKSHAW, supra note 6, at 151-52.
12. Since 1994, the CAS has been organized under the International Council of Arbitration for
Sport, rather than the IOC, but the IOC still funds a major portion of the CAS budget. Id. at 152.
13. Id. at 152.
14. INT’ L OLYMPIC COMM., OLYMPIC CHARTER 103 (2011), available at
www.olympic.org/Documents/olympic_charter_en.pdf (“Any dispute rising on the occasion of, or in
connection with, the Olympic Games shall be submitted exclusively to the Court of Arbitration for
Sport (CAS), in accordance with the Code of Sports-Related Arbitration.”).
15. FÈDÈRATION I NTERNATIONALE DE FOOTBALL ASS’N, FIFA STATUTES: REGULATIONS
GOVERNING THE APPLICATION OF THE STATUTES STANDING ORDERS OF THE CONGRESS 44 (2011),
available at
http://www.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/generic/01/48/60/05/fifastatuten2011%5fe.pdf
(Article 62 states that “the CAS Code of Sports-Related Arbitration shall apply to the proceedings”).
16. The first CAS Ad Hoc Tribunal was established for the 1996 Summer Olympic Games in
Atlanta, Georgia. See generally GABRIELLE KAUFMANN-KOHLER, ARBITRATION AT THE OLYMPICS:
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Division handles disputes referred by the parties directly to the CAS; most
often, commercial cases or disputes between sports federations. 17 The
Appeals Arbitration Division hears appeals from decisions of international
and national federations, usually involving disciplinary cases. 18 Both
divisions review questions of law and fact de novo, 19 and CAS awards are
final and binding. 20
The Code of Sports-Related Arbitration, the CAS’s governing statute,
designates Lausanne, Switzerland as the arbitral seat for any CAS arbitration
proceeding,21 regardless of whether the actual hearing takes place in
Switzerland.22 As a result, domestic courts recognize CAS awards as
foreign arbitral awards for purposes of the New York Convention. 23 Thus,
parties may only petition to set aside a CAS award through the Swiss
Federal Tribunal (Supreme Court). 24 For courts outside of Switzerland, the

ISSUES OF FAST-TRACK DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND SPORTS LAW 1 (2001) [hereinafter KAUFMANNKOHLER, ARBITRATION AT THE OLYMPICS].
17. History of the CAS: Types of Disputes Submitted to the CAS, CT. ARB. FOR SPORT,
http://www.tas-cas.org/en/infogenerales.asp/4-3-239-1011-4-1-1/5-0-1011-3-0-0/ (last visited Mar.
31, 2012).
18. Id.
19. “The Panel shall have full power to review the facts and the law.” I NT’ L OLYMPIC COMM.,
STATUTES OF THE BODIES WORKING FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF SPORTS -RELATED DISPUTES R57
(2010) [hereinafter CAS CODE], available at
http://www.tas-cas.org/d2wfiles/document/3923/5048/0/Code%202010%20(en).pdf. The CAS Code
is also known as the Code of Sports-Related Arbitration. For a critique of the CAS Appellate
Division’s de novo standard of arbitral review, see Maureen A. Weston, Simply a Dress Rehearsal?
U.S. Olympic Sports Arbitration and De Novo Review at the Court of Arbitration for Sport, 38 GA. J.
INT’ L & COMP. L. 97, 103-04 (2009) (arguing that by granting the CAS the power to hear cases de
novo, “the United States has implicitly assigned the protection of the rights of its citizens to a private
international tribunal seated in a foreign nation”).
20. Although the name suggests otherwise, awards rendered by the Ordinary Arbitration
Division may not be appealed to the Appeals Arbitration Division unless “such appeal has been
expressly provided by the rules applicable to the procedure of first instance.” CAS CODE, supra note
19, at R47.
21. Id. at R28.
22. In the case of Raguz v Sullivan, an Australian athlete challenged a CAS award made in
Sydney, Australia in connection with the 2000 Summer Olympic Games on the grounds that the
New York Convention did not apply to an arbitral proceeding held in Australia involving Australian
parties. Raguz v Sullivan [2000] NSWCA 240 (Austl.). The Court of New South Wales upheld the
award, holding that designation of Switzerland as the arbitral seat rendered the award “nondomestic” for purposes of the New York Convention. Id.
23. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3; 21 U.S.T. 2517 [hereinafter New York Convention].
24. 20 Questions About the CAS: Is it Possible to Appeal Against a CAS Award?, CT. ARB .
FOR SPORT, http://www.tas-cas.org/en/20questions.asp/4-3-231-1010-4-1-1/5-0-1010-13-0-0/ (last
visited Mar. 31, 2012).
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grounds for resisting enforcement in domestic courts are limited to those
found in the New York Convention. 25
Each of the two main CAS divisions has its own set of default rules for
the applicable substantive law. 26 Both rely primarily on international
sporting codes and the Olympic Charter, but the choice of subsidiary law
varies by division. 27 For the Ordinary Arbitration Division, the CAS Code
provides that: “The Panel shall decide the dispute according to the rules of
law chosen by the parties or, in the absence of such a choice, according to
Swiss law.”28 In contrast, the default rule for subsidiary law in the Appeals
Arbitration Division is: “[T]he law of the country in which the federation,
association or sports-related body which has issued the challenged decision
is domiciled or according to the rules of law, the application of which the
Panel deems appropriate.”29 Since most international sports federations are
located in Switzerland, both divisions usually apply the same law.30 For
track and field, however, since the International Association of Athletics
Federations (IAAF) headquarters are in Monaco, 31 the subsidiary law
applicable to disputes is either Swiss or Monegasque law, depending on
whether the Ordinary or Appeals Arbitration Division hears the dispute. 32
An athlete becomes a party to an agreement to arbitrate disputes at the
CAS through two possible avenues: (1) through the bylaws of national
sporting federations, of which athletes are members,33 and (2) through
signing the entry form required for participation in the Olympic games,

25. New York Convention, supra note 23, art. 5.
26. CAS CODE, supra note 19, at S3.
27. Id.
28. Id. at R45.
29. Id. at R58.
30. Forty-seven international sports federations are based in Switzerland, compared to five in
Monaco, the next most popular federation host country. Samuel Jaberg, How Switzerland
Champions Champions, SWISSI NFO.CH (Julia Slater trans., Jan. 25, 2010, 1:17 PM),
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/specials/switzerland_for_the_record/world_records/How_Switzerland_
champions_champions.html?cid=8149794.
31. INT’ L ASS’N OF ATHLETICS FED’ NS, CONSTITUTION 7 (2011), available at
http://www.iaaf.org/mm/Document/06/28/25/ded17e35-fb04-4a83-801fa3dcf4ec5f38_PDF_English.pdf (Article 1 states that “[t]he IAAF is established for an indefinite
period with legal status as an association under the laws of Monaco (Act No. 1072 of 27 June
1984)”).
32. CAS CODE, supra note 19, at R45, R58.
33. KAUFMANN-KOHLER, ARBITRATION AT THE OLYMPICS, supra note 16, at 106-07.
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which contains an agreement to arbitrate disputes according to the Olympic
Charter and Swiss law. 34
III. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. Precedent in Arbitration
In general, arbitral awards do not have precedential value. 35 This
follows from the practice of keeping international arbitral awards
confidential.36 It would be unfair and impractical to require parties to rely
on secret precedents.37 Nevertheless, certain arbitral tribunals do ascribe
precedential value to past arbitral awards—for example, in international
maritime and construction arbitration. 38 Proponents of using arbitral
precedent justify the practice as a means for the parties to reap the benefits
of the arbitrators’ industry-specific knowledge and expertise. 39 Reliance on
precedent also promotes legal uniformity and consistency. 40
Both of these arguments apply to the use of arbitral precedent in the
international sports context. In establishing the CAS, the IOC aimed to
provide a “level playing field” for competitors from different countries and
to create a uniquely specialized sports dispute resolution forum. 41 There are
also practical reasons that may explain the CAS’s reliance on previous
arbitral awards. Since the CAS exercises near exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over disputes in Olympic sports, 42 national courts no longer have
occasion to interpret international sports charters or codes. This lack of
judicial precedent grows even more pronounced as these charters and codes

34. Id.
35. See, e.g., NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND H UNTER ON I NTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION § 1.113 (student version, 5th ed., 2009) (“There is no system of binding precedents in
international arbitration . . . .”).
36. GARY BORN, I NTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1059 (2010).
37. BLACKSHAW, supra note 6, at 159 (stating that “the CAS is able to grant parties in dispute
very valuable, relevant and generally effective kinds of interim protection and relief at an early stage
in the proceedings; and these measures deserve to be better known and more widely used”).
38. BORN, supra note 36, at 1059.
39. Id.
40. See BLACKSHAW, supra note 6, at 155.
41. See id. (one-fifth of the arbitrators are chosen with a view to safeguarding the interests of
the athletes).
42. See id. at 154. Submission forms required for athletes to participate in the Olympic Games
include a standard arbitration clause which states: “I agree that any dispute . . . shall be submitted
exclusively to the Court of Arbitration for Sports (CAS).” Id.
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are amended or replaced. As a result, domestic judicial interpretations of
international sports regulations may be practically unavailable.
Other scholars have identified more cynical motives for the emergence
of a lex sportiva—namely, as “a cloak for continued self-regulation by
international sports federations.” 43 Under this interpretation, the use of
arbitral precedent arises as a means of avoiding national legislation
altogether. Indeed, CAS decisions are generally self-enforcing within
international sports bodies. 44 For disciplinary violations, the sanctions often
include disqualification or ineligibility for participation in international
sports.45 Thus, even if a national sports federation wished to evade
enforcement of a CAS award, the athlete involved would still remain
ineligible for international competition. As a result, the CAS rarely requires
the assistance of national authorities for enforcement of its awards.46
B. Stare Decisis or Jurisprudence Constante?
Regardless of the reasons for the CAS’s reliance on precedent, there is
little doubt that the practice occurs. 47 The question remains, however,
whether CAS case law constitutes binding or persuasive authority. No CAS
panel has gone so far as to explicitly recognize a principle of stare decisis,
but panels’ frequent citations to previous CAS awards suggests a de facto
doctrine of stare decisis may already be in operation. 48 More precisely, the
question is whether the CAS applies a doctrine of horizontal stare decisis,
“the doctrine that a court . . . must adhere to its own prior decisions, unless it
finds compelling reasons to overrule itself.” 49 Alternatively, what appears to
be a doctrine of stare decisis from the perspective of a common law scholar
may be more accurately described as a doctrine of jurisprudence constante,

43. Foster, Is There a Global Sports Law?, supra note 1, at 2-18.
44. See BLACKSHAW, supra note 6, at 174 (“[T]he CAS decisions are legally effective and can
be enforced internationally.”).
45. See infra notes 71-77 and accompanying text (discussing cases involving challenges to
sanctions imposed for disciplinary violations).
46. One possible exception in which the CAS might require the assistance of national
authorities would be for provisional relief measures; however, this question remains a matter of
debate. BLACKSHAW, supra note 6, at 158-59.
47. See, e.g., Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitral Precedent, supra note 6 (noting the CAS’s frequent
citations to precedent).
48. See, e.g., Anderson v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), 2008/A/1545 (July 16, 2010)
(containing over twenty citations to previous CAS awards).
49. BLACK’S LAW D ICTIONARY 1537 (9th ed. 2009).
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in which the CAS generally follows the weight of past precedent, but
remains free to depart from previous awards in the interests of justice.50
C. Departures from Precedent in the CAS
Scholars have identified at least one counterexample to the CAS trend of
following past awards. 51 A commonly cited example of lex sportiva is the
principle of strict liability for doping cases. 52 That is, the existence of a
positive doping test is itself sufficient to establish a violation, regardless of
the athlete’s state of mind.53 Nevertheless, in both A. v. Federation
Internationale de Luttes Associees (FILA)54 and Q. v. Union Internationale
de Tir (UIT),55 CAS panels declined to recognize a general principle of strict
liability. In the Q. case, decided in 1995, the panel concluded that the
international shooting federation’s (UIT)56 doping regulations did not create
a rule of strict liability. 57 Thus, subsequent cases recognizing a general
principle of strict liability for all sports conflict with the panel’s decision in
Q., which held instead that the relevant sporting code must clearly establish
a standard of strict liability.58
In the Fritz Aanes case, the panel acknowledged that previous CAS
awards recognized a general principle of strict liability, but decided instead
to treat a positive doping test as presumptive evidence of guilt and allow the
athlete to rebut the presumption. 59 Janwillem Soek observes that the panel
in the Fritz Aanes case was comprised of lawyers from the civil law
tradition, whereas panels comprised of common law jurists issued previous

50. Id. at 933 (defining jurisprudence constante as the “doctrine that a court should give great
weight to a rule of law that is accepted and applied in a long line of cases . . . unless clear error is
shown and injustice will arise from continuation of a particular rule of law.”).
51. JANWILLEM SOEK, THE STRICT LIABILITY PRINCIPLE AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF
ATHLETES IN D OPING CASES 164-67 (2006) (citing A. v. Fed’n Internationale de Luttes Associees
(FILA), CAS 2000/A/317 (July 9, 2001) as a counterexample to the principle of strict liability).
52. Canadian Olympic Comm. (COC) v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS 2002/O/373, ¶ 14
(Dec. 18, 2003).
53. Id.
54. A., CAS 2000/A/317, at ¶ 39.
55. Q. v. Union Internationale de Tir (UIT), CAS 94/129, ¶ 21 (May 23, 1995).
56. In 1998, the Union Internationale de Tir (UIT) was renamed the “International Shooting
Sport Federation.”
The ISSF History, INT’L SHOOTING SPORT FED’N, http://www.issfsports.org/theissf/history.ashx (last visited Mar. 31, 2012).
57. Id.
58. Id. ¶ 34-35.
59. A., CAS 2000/A/317, at ¶ 39 (“[T]he Panel is conscious of the fact that there have been
CAS decisions where the Panel was prepared to apply a strict liability standard with respect to
suspensions and was not willing to take into account the subjective elements of the case in
questions.”).
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decisions on strict liability.60 Likewise, three civil law jurists served as
arbitrators in the Q. case.61 This suggests the use of precedent may vary
depending on the backgrounds of the arbitrators.62
IV. METHODS
The sample analyzed consists of published awards for track and field
involving doping allegations. 63 These include decisions on individual
doping violations and the consequence of doping violations for relay
eligibility.64 Within a single sport and type of dispute there should be less
variation in the amount of applicable precedent than would be the case if a
greater variety of cases were examined.65 As a result, variations in the use of
precedent in the cases sampled should be more likely to result from panel
decision making than the lack of applicable precedent for a certain type of
case.66
There are two main sources of published awards: the three-volume print
Digest of CAS Awards 67 and the CAS website, which includes a searchable
database of awards. 68 Neither source is comprehensive. The editors of the
print volumes selected cases they considered noteworthy. 69 Although the
CAS has announced its intention to publish on its website all

60. SOEK, supra note 51, at 167. The arbitrators in the A. case were German, Norwegian, and
Swiss. Id.
61. Two of the arbitrators in the Q. case were from Switzerland and the third was from France.
Q., CAS 94/129, at 1.
62. Id.
63. See infra note 71.
64. See e.g., U.S. Olympic Comm. (USOC) v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS 2004/A/725
(July 20, 2005).
65. See e.g., Canadian Olympic Comm. (COC) v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS
2002/O/373, ¶ 14 (Dec. 18, 2003).
66. See, e.g., Ohuruogu v. U.K. Athletics Ltd. (UKA), CAS 2006/A/1165, ¶ 17 (Apr. 3, 2007).
67. COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, D IGEST OF CAS AWARDS: 1986–1998 (Matthieu
Reeb ed., 1998) [hereinafter CAS D IGEST I]; COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, D IGEST OF CAS
AWARDS II: 1998–2000 (Matthieu Reeb ed., 2002) [hereinafter CAS D IGEST II]; COURT OF
ARBITRATION FOR SPORT, D IGEST OF CAS AWARDS III: 2001–2003 (Matthieu Reeb ed., 2004)
[hereinafter CAS D IGEST III].
68. Welcome to the “Jurisprudence” Database!, CT. ARB . FOR SPORT (July 10, 2009, 11:24
PM), http://jurisprudence.tas-cas.org/sites/caselaw/help/home.aspx.
69. CAS D IGEST I, supra note 47, at XXIII.

197

Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2012

9

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 1

nonconfidential awards issued since the tribunal was first established, the
database is still under construction.70
A total of twenty-three awards were examined. 71 These include two
awards from ad hoc panels for the Olympic Games, three awards made in
Ordinary Arbitration Division proceedings, and eighteen awards rendered on
appeal from national or international federation decisions. 72 The awards
were issued between 2000 and 2010.73
Each arbitral award was analyzed according to the following criteria: (1)
whether it included citations to previous CAS awards; (2) whether the panel
followed, distinguished, or rejected precedent; (3) the proposition which the
cited award(s) stands for; and (4) whether the panel was comprised of
common law jurists, civil law jurists, or a mix of the two. The author
expected that panels would cite frequently to past awards and tend to follow
precedent, and when panels did in fact depart from precedent, they were
more likely to be comprised of civil law jurists than jurists from common
law backgrounds or a mix of the two.

70. “As of January 2009, the awards issued after 2003 are gradually being added to the
database so that in the long term . . . there will be a complete coverage of the CAS awards.”
Welcome to the Database of CAS Awards, CT. ARB. FOR SPORT, http://www.tascas.org/jurisprudence-archives (last visited Mar. 26, 2012).
71. Anderson v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), 2008/A/1545 (July 16, 2010); Devyatovskiy v.
Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS 2009/A/1752 (June 10, 2010); Anderson v. Int’l Olympic Comm.
(IOC), 2008/A/1545 PA (Dec. 18, 2009); Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns (IAAF) v. All Russia
Fed’n, CAS 2008/A/1718 (Nov. 18, 2009); Kop v. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns (IAAF), CAS
2008/A/1585 (Nov. 10, 2009); Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns (IAAF) v. Real Federatión Española
de Atletismo (RFEA), CAS 2009/A/1805 (Sept. 22, 2009); Gatlin v. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency
(USADA), CAS 2008/A/1461 (June 6, 2008); Ohuruogu v. U.K. Athletics Ltd. (UKA), CAS
2006/A/1165 (Apr. 3, 2007); U.S. Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) v. G., 2004/O/649 (Dec. 13,
2005); U.S. Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) v. M., CAS 2004/O/645 (Dec. 13, 2005); U.S. Olympic
Comm. (USOC) v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS 2004/A/725 (July 20, 2005); A. v. Int’l
Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS 2004/A/718 (Mar. 31, 2005); F. v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS
2004/A/714 (Mar. 31, 2005); Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns (IAAF) v. U.S.A. Track & Field
(USATF), CAS 2004/A/628 (June 28, 2004); Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns (IAAF) v. Fèdèration
Royale Marocaine d’Athlètisme (MAR), CAS 2003/A/452 (Nov. 19, 2003); Int’l Ass’n of Athletics
Fed’ns (IAAF) v. Fèdèration Camerounaise d’Athlètisme (CMR), CAS 2003/A/448 (Oct. 2, 2003);
W. v. UK Athletics, CAS 2003/A/455 (Aug. 21, 2003); Longo v. Int’l Ass’n of Athletic Fed’ns
(IAAF), CAS 2002/A/409 (Mar. 28, 2003); Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns (IAAF) v. U.S.A. Track
& Field (USATF), CAS 2002/O/401 (Jan. 10, 2003); Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns (IAAF) v. CAF
& Z., CAS 2002/A/362 (Aug. 27, 2002); F. v. Int’l Sports Org. for the Disabled (ISOD), CAS
2001/A/328 (Aug. 3, 2001); Melinte v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n (IAAF), CAS 00/015 (Sept. 29,
2000); Baumann v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS 00/006 (Sept. 22, 2000).
72. See supra note 51.
73. See, e.g., Anderson, CAS 2008/A/1545; Baumann, CAS 00/006.
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There are a few main limitations to this study. First, not all CAS
decisions are published. 74 While publication remains the default rule, parties
may opt to keep the award confidential.75 This may lead to selection bias if
parties prefer to avoid disclosing awards that deviate from past CAS
jurisprudence. Another potential source of bias is the lack of access to the
parties’ briefs.76 In their awards, panels might refer only to previous arbitral
awards that the panel believes were rightly decided. Thus, panels might
ignore contrary citations in a party’s submissions that would reveal the
panel’s divergence from past precedent. Lastly, this study addresses only
disciplinary cases. The CAS also hears commercial disputes, which most
likely involve greater overlap with existing domestic and international
regulation—such as European Union competition rules. 77 As a result, the
findings in this study may not apply to commercial cases.
V. RESULTS
A. Frequency and Use of Precedent
Of the twenty-three awards analyzed, 78 seventeen contain at least one
citation to a previous CAS award.79 In each award that contained a citation
to precedent, the panel either followed or distinguished 80 previous CAS
awards. None of the awards explicitly departed from precedent.81 For

74. See Procedural Rules: A. General Provisions, CT. ARB . FOR SPORT, http://www.tascas.org/rules (last visited Mar. 26, 2012) [hereinafter Procedural Rules] (explaining that arbiters
“may decide to publish”); Are the Arbitration Proceedings Confidential?, CT. ARB. FOR SPORT,
http://www.tas-cas.org/en/20questions.asp/4-3-229-1010-4-1-1/5-0-1010-13-0-0/ (last visited Mar.
26, 2012) [hereinafter Proceedings Confidential].
75. Proceedings Confidential, supra note 54 (“Generally speaking, unless the parties agree
otherwise, the award may be published by the CAS.”).
76. Id. (“The parties, arbitrators and CAS staff are obliged not to disclose any information
connected with the dispute.”).
77. See What Kinds of Dispute Can Be Submitted to the CAS?, CT. ARB. FOR SPORT,
http://www.tas-cas.org/en/20questions.asp/4-3-217-1010-4-1-1/5-0-1010-13-0-0/ (last visited Mar.
26, 2012) (writing that CAS accepts “disputes of a commercial nature (e.g. a sponsorship contract)”).
78. See infra Table 1.
79. See supra note 51.
80. See, e.g., Ohuruogu v. U.K. Athletics Ltd. (UKA), CAS 2006/A/1165, ¶ 17 (Apr. 3, 2007)
(explicitly distinguishing a previous award).
81. Id.
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awards that did not contain references to past precedent, the panel appeared
to find the applicable sporting codes dispositive.82
An example from two disputes with nearly identical facts illustrates the
CAS panels’ approach to previous awards. In United States Olympic
Committee (USOC) v. International Olympic Committee (IOC), the panel
was asked to determine whether the members of the United States 4x400
meter relay team from the 2000 Summer Olympic Games in Sydney,
Australia would be allowed to keep their gold medals following the
revelation that one of the team members, Jerome Young, had been found
guilty of a doping offense prior to the Olympic Games and was therefore
ineligible to compete. 83 The International Amateur Athletic Federation
(IAAF) Rules in force in 2000 did not expressly address the consequences of
doping offenses for relay teams, only for individual athletes.84 The IAAF
cited to previous CAS awards from team sports to argue that a single team
member’s ineligibility should nevertheless result in disqualification of the
entire team.85 The panel rejected the IAAF’s argument, ruling that previous
awards in other sports were not applicable; the plain language of the IAAF
Rules omitted any sanctions for relay teams. 86 Instead, the panel cited Q.87
for the proposition that there is no liability unless an offense is clearly stated
in the relevant code.88 In other words, sanctions must be predictable. As a
result, the panel allowed the athletes to keep their medals. 89
Four years later, a CAS panel again faced a nearly identical set of facts
in Andrea Anderson v. International Olympic Committee (IOC).90 The
dispute arose following United States sprinter Marion Jones’s admission that
she had taken performance-enhancing drugs before, during, and after the
2000 Summer Olympic Games. 91 Jones had competed in two relay races in
Sydney, Australia, winning the bronze medal in the 4x100 meter relay and
the gold medal in the 4x400 meter relay. 92 Despite the CAS ruling in the
82. See, e.g., Gatlin v. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency (USADA), CAS 2008/A/1461 (June 6, 2008)
(holding that the plain language of the IAAF rules regarding a second doping offense determined the
length of United States sprinter Justin Gatlin’s suspension from competition).
83. U.S. Olympic Comm. (USOC) v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS 2004/A/725 (July 20,
2005).
84. Id. ¶ 14.
85. Id. ¶ 8.
86. Id. ¶ 7.
87. Q. v. Union Internationale de Tir (UIT), CAS 94/129, ¶ 21 (May 23, 1995).
88. Id. ¶ 21.
89. U.S. Olympic Comm. (USOC) v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS 2004/A/725, at 11
(July 20, 2005).
90. Anderson v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS 2008/A/1545 (July 16, 2010).
91. Id. at 2.
92. Id. at 3.
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Jerome Young case, the IOC Disciplinary Commission demanded that
Jones’s teammates return their medals. 93 The athletes appealed to the CAS,
arguing that the Young award was dispositive for their case.94 The panel
agreed that the Young case was directly on point, but rejected the appellants’
contention that a doctrine of stare decisis must apply: “This does not
automatically entail that the Panel is bound to decide in the same way as in
CAS 2004/A/725 on the basis of either the ‘stare decisis’ or the ‘collateral
estoppel’ principles, as advocated by the Appellants.”95
While the panel ultimately followed the Young award by overturning
the IOC Disciplinary Commission’s decision, it was careful to explain that
the Young award constituted persuasive, rather than binding precedent:
“[A]lthough a CAS panel in principle might end up deciding differently
from a previous panel, it must accord to previous CAS awards a substantial
precedential value and it is up to the party advocating a jurisprudential
change to submit persuasive arguments and evidence to that effect.”96 Thus,
while in practice, the CAS did not depart from precedent in this sample of
awards, CAS panels explicitly defend their authority to do so should the
need arise.
B. Types of Propositions Advanced
The type of proposition advanced fell into four general categories: (1)
use of a particular testing method or procedure as evidence of a doping
violation; (2) substance of parties’ right to be heard; (3) rules of evidence;
and (4) general principles of equity.
In the first category, awards cited to precedent to support the use of a
specific type of technical evidence to confirm a doping violation. 97 The
athletes involved had each attempted to discredit a positive doping test on
the grounds that the testing methods were somehow scientifically unproven

93. Id.
94. Id. ¶ 50.
95. Id. ¶ 52.
96. Id. ¶ 55.
97. See Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’n (IAAF) v. Fèdèration Royale Marocaine d’Athlètisme
(MAR), CAS 2003/A/452, ¶ 17 (Nov. 19, 2003); Melinte v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n (IAAF),
CAS 00/015, ¶ 8 (Sept. 29, 2000); Baumann v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS 00/006, ¶ 40
(Sept. 22, 2000).
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or illegitimate. 98 In the three awards examined, CAS panels dismissed these
allegations by citing to past awards that found doping violations based on
the same testing methods. 99 For example, in International Association of
Athletics Federations (IAAF) v. Fédération Royale Marocaine d’Athlétisme
(MAR), the Moroccan Track and Field Federation and the world record
holder in the steeplechase, Brahmin Boulami, challenged the results of an incompetition doping test conducted on Boulami in Zurich, Switzerland,
which detected the presence of the blood booster erythropoietin (EPO).100
The Moroccan Track and Field Federation argued that the testing method
used was scientifically suspect and not “internationally recognized.” 101 The
CAS panel dismissed this claim, noting that the same testing method had
been used in previous cases arbitrated at the CAS in connection with the
2002 Winter Olympic Games in Salt Lake City, Utah. 102
The second category of precedent involves disputes in which one of the
parties claimed that irregularities in the initial national or international
disciplinary hearing violated the party’s right to be heard. 103 For example, in
A. v. International Olympic Committee (IOC), Adrìan Annus, a Hungarian
hammer thrower, challenged the IOC’s decision to strip him of his gold
medal after Annus failed to submit to drug testing. 104 Annus claimed, inter
alia, that the IOC’s disciplinary hearing was invalid because he did not
attend, due to poor health. 105 The panel rejected Annus’s claim—as did the
panels in the three other cases in the sample involving violations of the right
to be heard—on the ground that the CAS’s de novo standard of review cures
any deficiencies in the initial disciplinary proceedings. 106
An example from the third category, rules of evidence, is the rule that a
tribunal may—but is not required to—draw adverse inferences from a
party’s silence. In United States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) v. M., the
panel considered how it should address United States sprinter Tim
Montgomery’s refusal to testify in response to allegations that Montgomery
98. Baumann, CAS 00/006, ¶ 40 (a)-(c); Melinte, CAS 00/015, ¶ 8; MAR, CAS 2003/A/452, ¶
9.
99. Baumann, CAS 00/006, ¶ 40 (a)-(c); Melinte, CAS 00/015, ¶ 8; MAR, CAS 2003/A/452, ¶
16-59.
100. MAR, CAS 2003/A/452, at 1-2.
101. Id. ¶ 10.
102. Id. ¶ 17.
103. See A. v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), 2004/A/718, ¶ 7 (Mar. 31, 2005); F. v. Int’l
Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS 2004/A/714, ¶ 11 (Mar. 31, 2005); W. v. U.K. Athletics, CAS
2003/A/455, ¶ 12 (Aug. 21, 2003); Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’n (IAAF) v. CAF & Z., CAS
2002/A/362, ¶ 21 (Aug. 27, 2002).
104. A., 2004/A/718, at 1-3.
105. Id. ¶ 6.
106. Id. ¶ 7.
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used performance-enhancing drugs obtained through the Bay Area
Laboratory Cooperative (BALCO). 107 Although the panel noted that
previous CAS awards permitted a panel to draw “certain adverse
inferences”108 in this context, the panel concluded that the case against
Montgomery was strong enough that no adverse inference was needed. 109
Lastly, CAS panels rely on previous awards to establish general
equitable principles. For example, in International Association of Athletics
Federations (IAAF) v. U.S.A. Track & Field (USATF), the panel faced a
dispute over whether USATF was required to disclose to the IAAF the
identities of athletes who were exonerated in USATF disciplinary
hearings.110 Over a four-year period, USATF responded to IAAF requests
for this information by citing the USATF confidentiality policy and asking
the IAAF to point to the specific IAAF rule that required disclosure. 111 The
IAAF did not respond to USATF’s repeated requests.112 The CAS panel
resolved the issue by citing to previous cases for the proposition that,
“[W]here the conduct of one party has led to legitimate expectations on the
part of a second party, the first party is estopped from changing its course of
action to the detriment of the second party.” 113 Since the IAAF did not
respond to USATF’s requests, and the athletes in question had received
USATF’s contractual assurances that their identities would not be released,
the CAS panel ruled that the IAAF was equitably estopped from requesting
this information. 114 Revealing the athletes’ identities would conflict with
both the legitimate expectations of USATF and the athletes involved. 115
C. Panel Composition
This study provides no support for the theory that an arbitrator’s
background determines a panel’s approach to precedent. Of the twenty-three

107. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) v. M., CAS 2004/O/645, ¶ 9 (Dec. 13, 2005) (error
in original source has two ¶¶ 9-11).
108. Id. ¶ 11.
109. Id. ¶ 9.
110. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’n (IAAF) v. U.S.A. Track & Field (USATF), CAS
2002/O/401 (Jan. 10, 2003).
111. Id. ¶ 42-52.
112. Id. ¶ 53.
113. Id. ¶ 68.
114. Id. ¶ 72-77.
115. Id.
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total awards, five were issued by panels comprised of exclusively common
law jurists, three by exclusively civil law jurists, and fourteen by a
combination of the two. 116 Of the five awards from common law panels,
three included citations to precedent, 117 and two of the three civil law panels
did as well.118 Thus, the percentage of awards that cited previous arbitral
awards was actually slightly higher for civil law panels than for common
law panels. For mixed panels, twelve of fourteen cited to past precedent. 119
VI. CONCLUSION
The results of this study lend further support to the view that the CAS is
developing its own body of private international legal precedent outside the
purview of domestic legislation. Although CAS panels unambiguously
reject the notion that they apply a doctrine of stare decisis, this study
illustrates panels’ de facto adherence to precedent. As long as CAS panels
continue to assert their authority to depart from past precedent, the CAS
approach appears more akin to one of jurisprudence constante than stare
decisis.120 For parties, the practical implication is perhaps the same under
either doctrine—claims that run contrary to previous CAS awards are

116. F. v. Int’l Sports Org. for the Disabled (ISOD), CAS 2001/A/328 (Aug. 3, 2001)
(arbitrators not named).
117. Compare U.S. Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) v. G., 2004/O/649 (Dec. 13, 2005); U.S.
Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) v. M., CAS 2004/O/645 (Dec. 13, 2005); Baumann v. Int’l Olympic
Comm. (IOC), CAS 00/006 (Sept. 22, 2000) (citing previous CAS awards), with Int’l Ass’n of
Athletics Fed’ns (IAAF) v. U.S.A. Track & Field (USATF), CAS 2004/A/628 (June 28, 2004); Int’l
Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns (IAAF) v. Fèdèration Camerounaise d’Athlètisme (CMR), CAS
2003/A/448 (Oct. 2, 2003) (previous CAS awards not cited).
118. Compare F. v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS 2004/A/714 (Mar. 31, 2005); Longo v.
Int’l Ass’n of Athletic Fed’ns (IAAF), CAS 2002/A/409 (Mar. 28, 2003) (citing previous CAS
awards), with Kop v. Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns (IAAF), CAS 2008/A/1585 (Nov. 10, 2009)
(previous CAS awards not cited).
119. Compare Anderson v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS 2008/A/1545, ¶ 3 (July 16,
2010); Devyatovskiy v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS 2009/A/1752 (June 10, 2010); Anderson
v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), 2008/A/1545 PA (Dec. 18, 2009); Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns
(IAAF) v. All Russia Fed’n, CAS 2008/A/1718 (Nov. 18, 2009); Ohuruogu v. U.K. Athletics Ltd.
(UKA), CAS 2006/A/1165 (Apr. 3, 2007); U.S. Olympic Comm. (USOC) v. Int’l Olympic Comm.
(IOC), CAS 2004/A/725 (July 20, 2005); A. v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS 2004/A/718 (Mar.
31, 2005); Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns (IAAF) v. Fèdèration Royale Marocaine d’Athlètisme
(MAR), CAS 2003/A/452 (Nov. 19, 2003); W. v. UK Athletics, CAS 2003/A/455 (Aug. 21, 2003);
Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns (IAAF) v. U.S.A. Track & Field (USATF), CAS 2002/O/401 (Jan.
10, 2003); Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns (IAAF) v. CAF & Z., CAS 2002/A/362 (Aug. 27, 2002);
Melinte v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n (IAAF), CAS 00/015 (Sept. 29, 2000) (citing previous CAS
awards), with Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns (IAAF) v. Real Federatión Española de Atletismo
(RFEA), CAS 2009/A/1805 (Sept. 22, 2009); Gatlin v. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency (USADA), CAS
2008/A/1461 (June 6, 2008) (previous CAS awards not cited).
120. BLACKSHAW, supra note 6, at 155.
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unlikely to succeed. 121 CAS panels are extremely reluctant to depart from
precedent.122 In the interest of fairness to the parties, it is therefore critical
that the CAS publish all nonconfidential awards, and refrain from allowing
parties to rely on confidential awards.
The application of jurisprudence constante to CAS arbitration also
raises questions with respect to the parties’ choice of law. For example,
CAS awards sometimes cite precedent from a different division. 123 Since the
Ordinary and Appeals Arbitration Divisions follow different default rules for
the applicable subsidiary law, reliance on precedent across divisions runs the
risk of a conflict with the applicable subsidiary law.124 Admittedly, the
difference between interpreting international sports regulations under Swiss
as opposed to Monegasque law is perhaps of no practical import. 125
Nevertheless, citing to precedent without reference to the applicable law
runs contrary to the principle of party autonomy in arbitration. One CAS
panel attempted to evade this quandary by arguing that the parties implicitly
chose lex sportiva as their governing law: “Since CAS jurisprudence is
largely based on a variety of sports regulations, the parties’ reliance on CAS
precedents in their pleadings amounts to the choice of that specific body of
case law encompassing certain general principles derived from and
applicable to sports regulations.” 126
That is, when parties refer to precedent in their briefs, the panel may
rely on past awards as a means of honoring the principle of party
autonomy.127 This doctrine could create a problematic dilemma for parties,
however. Considering the CAS tends to follow past awards, claims that run
contrary to precedent have little chance of succeeding. Thus, a party would
be remiss to avoid citing to CAS awards that favor her position. On the
other hand, panels may treat citations to precedent as evidence of the party’s
acquiescence to the choice of lex sportiva as a source of substantive law

121. See supra note 51; Ohuruogu, CAS 2006/A/1165, at ¶ 17 (rather than departing from prior
precedent, the Panel distinguished the case from prior precedent).
122. See Anderson, CAS 2008/A/1545, ¶ 55 (“[I]t must accord to previous CAS awards a
substantial precedential value and it is up to the party advocating a jurisprudential change to submit
persuasive arguments . . . .”).
123. See Mitten & Opie, supra note 3, at 291.
124. See CAS CODE, supra note 19, at R45.
125. See id.
126. Canadian Olympic Comm. (COC) v. Int’l Olympic Comm. (IOC), CAS 2002/O/372, ¶ 14
(Dec. 18, 2003).
127. Id.
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governing the arbitration. 128 If only one party cites to CAS precedent, what
then? The award in Anderson confirms that parties may at least “in theory”
plead based on the lex sportiva, provided the content of the law asserted is
sufficiently clear and predictable. 129 Future research on the CAS is needed
to determine the means by which parties “opt in” or “opt out” of the use of
CAS precedent.
In sum, while this study does not attempt to provide a definitive answer
to the debate over whether the CAS follows a doctrine of stare decisis, to the
extent that the sample is representative of CAS jurisprudence more
generally, it suggests that the use of precedent approximates the civil law
doctrine of jurisprudence constante rather than stare decisis. CAS panels
follow past awards, but do not regard precedent as binding. 130 At a
minimum, the CAS’s exclusive jurisdiction over disciplinary cases involving
international-level Olympic athletes, as well as the emergence of a body of
CAS jurisprudence independent of national legislation, has already led to the
emergence of a distinctively autonomous system of global private
regulation.

128. See, e.g., LATTY, supra note 1.
129. Anderson, CAS 2008/A/1545, ¶ 65.
130. See BLACKSHAW, supra note 6, at 155.
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TABLE 1: COMPARISON OF PUBLISHED CAS AWARDS IN TRACK AND FIELD

CASE
NO.

PARTIES

ARBITRATOR
BACKGROUND

USE OF
PRECEDENT

FOLLOWED/
DISTINGUISHED

1

CAS
00/006

Dieter Baumann
v. International
Olympic
Committee
(IOC), National
Olympic
Committee of
Germany &
International
Amateur Athletic
Federation
(IAAF)

Common law

Yes

Followed

2

CAS
00/015

Mihaela Melinte
v. International
Amateur Athletic
Federation
(IAAF)

Mixed

Yes

Followed

3

CAS
2001/A
/328

F. v.
International
Sports
Organization for
the Disabled
(ISOD),
International
Paralympic
Committee
(IPC), Disabled
Sports USA
(DS/USA)

Unknown

No

n/a
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4

CAS
2002/A
/362

International
Association of
Athletics
Federations
(IAAF) v. CAF &
Z.

Mixed

Yes

Followed

5

CAS
2002/O
/401

International
Association of
Athletics
Federations
(IAAF) v. USA
Track & Field
(USATF)

Mixed

Yes

Followed

6

CAS
2002/A
/409

Longo v.
International
Association of
Athletic
Federations
(IAAF)

Civil law

Yes

Followed

7

CAS
2003/A
/448

International
Association of
Athletics
Federations
(IAAF) v.
Fèdèration
Camerounaise
d’Athlètism
(CMR)

Common law

No

n/a

8

CAS
2003/A
/452

International
Association of
Athletics
Federations
(IAAF) v.
Fédération
Royale
Marocaine
d’Athlétisme
(MAR) & B.

Mixed

Yes

Followed

9

CAS
2003/A
/455

W. v. UK
Athletics

Mixed

Yes

Followed
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10

CAS
2004/A
/628

International
Association of
Athletics
Federations
(IAAF) v. USA
Track & Field
(USATF) & Y.

Common law

No

n/a

11

CAS
2004/O
/645

United States
Anti-Doping
Agency (USADA)
v. M. &
International
Association of
Athletics
Federation
(IAAF)

Common law

Yes

Followed

12

CAS
2004/O
/649

United States
Anti-Doping
Agency (USADA)
v. G.

Common law

Yes

Followed

13

CAS
2004/A
/714

F. v.
International
Olympic
Committee (IOC)

Civil law

Yes

Followed

14

CAS
2004/A
/725

United States
Olympic
Committee
(USOC) v.
International
Olympic
Committee (IOC)
& International
Association of
Athletics
Federation
(IAAF)

Mixed

Yes

Distinguished and
Followed
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15

CAS
2004/A
/718

A. v.
International
Olympic
Committee (IOC)

Mixed

Yes

Followed

16

CAS
2006/A
/1165

Christine
Ohuruogu v. UK
Athletics Limited
(UKA) &
International
Association of
Athletics
Federations
(IAAF)

Mixed

Yes

Distinguished

17

CAS
2008/A
/1461,
CAS
2008/A
/1462

Justin Gatlin v.
United States
Anti-Doping
Agency (USADA)
& IAAF v. USA
Track & Field
(USATF) &
Justin Gatlin

Mixed

No

n/a

18

CAS
2008/A
/1545
PA

Andrea
Anderson,
LaTasha
Colander Clark,
Jearl MilesClark, Torri
Edwards,
Chryste Gaines,
Monique
Hennagan,
Passion
Richardson v.
International
Olympic
Committee (IOC)

Mixed

Yes

Followed
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19

CAS
2008/A
/1545

Andrea
Anderson,
LaTasha
Colander Clark,
Jearl MilesClark, Torri
Edwards,
Chryste Gaines,
Monique
Hennagan,
Passion
Richardson v.
International
Olympic
Committee (IOC)

Mixed

Yes

Followed

20

CAS
2008/A
/1585,
CAS
2008/A
/1586

Yücel Kop v.
IAAF & TAF,
Süreyya Ayhan
Kop v. IAAF &
TAF

Civil law

No

n/a
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21

CAS
2008/A
/1718,
CAS
2008/A
/1719,
CAS
2008/A
/1720,
CAS
2008/A
/1721,
CAS
2008/A
/1722,
CAS
2008/A
/1723,
CAS
2008/A
/1724

IAAF v. All
Russia Athletic
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